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ABSTRACT
In a referendum in November 2004, the people of the North East decisively
rejected the proposal to create a directly elected Regional Assembly. This
result effectively put an end to proposals for Regional Assemblies elsewhere
as plans for referenda in other regions were consequently abandoned.
Drawing upon detailed interviews with a wide range of stakeholders in the
North East, this article assesses why the North East voted ‘No’ and argues
that despite the subsequent emergence of city-regions as an alternative
framework for governance, what is still needed is a serious commitment to
democratic renewal. Democratic connections between citizens and the state,
between the taxpayer and public services, need to be rebuilt. Only a
reinvigorated democracy can begin to dispel the cynicism and alienation that
characterises the contemporary political process – and which, was a main
factor behind the ‘No’ vote in the referendum. Given the failure of political
devolution at the regional level, genuine democratic renewal must now being
taken forward at the local level.
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2New Labour and the Devolution Agenda
‘The debate about the reform of the governance of the English regions
has tended to hinge on two related assumptions. The first of these is
that an extensive tier of government exists within the English regions in
the form of a plethora of government departments, quangos and other
bodies. To a greater or lesser degree the policies and actions of these
agencies are assumed to provide the framework for regional
development. The second assumption is that the fragmented structure
of bodies at the regional level contributes to a failure of governance
which produces poor public policy outcomes. The fragmented
character of the policy-making process – together with arguments
about the democratic deficit – are the lynchpin of the case for the
reform of regional governance in England’ (Tomaney, 2002 p 226).
Regional devolution seems to be an eminently sensible idea. The United
Kingdom has been viewed as possessing a very centralised system of
government, with an enormous concentration of power in Westminster and
Whitehall (Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001) There is a strong case for
decentralisation, for ‘subsidiarity’, devolving decision-making down to the
regional, sub-regional or local level. This would enable much greater
sensitivity and responsiveness to specific needs and circumstances, as well
as strengthening connections between individuals, communities and the multi-
layered state.
New Labour has been reasonably keen on devolution or, at the very least,
willing to respond to devolutionary pressures. Following referenda, the new
Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly were established in 1999 and,
following the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, the Northern Ireland Assembly
was set up. In England, the Greater London Assembly was established and,
elsewhere, regional structures were developed or strengthened. Regional
Development Agencies have been created in all the English regions, together
3with Regional Chambers to oversee them and provide a ‘voice’ for each
region (Sandford, 2001).
Of course, not all of this has gone smoothly. One need only think of the
controversy over the cost of the new Scottish Parliament building, unresolved
constitutional issues such as the role of Scottish MPs (the ‘West Lothian
Question’), and continuing difficulties in Northern Ireland. Nevertheless, the
Labour Government has continued to pursue their devolution ‘project’ (O’Neill
et al, 2004).
The North East of England has been caught up in these processes of
institutional restructuring and has played a particularly prominent (if uneven)
role in initially promoting, and then eventually resisting devolution. In 2002,
the Government set out plans for regional referenda to test proposals for
creating directly elected Regional Assemblies (Cabinet Office/DTLR, 2002).
These would replace the existing Regional Chambers which comprised local
authority nominees and representatives of regional economic and social
interests. The North East was to have the first such referendum. If
successful, it would be followed by others, in the North West and in the
Yorkshire and Humber region. What was then envisaged was the gradual
emergence of a regional elected tier of government across the country.
The choice of the North East as the ‘pilot’ region reflected the fact that for
several years prior to the referendum, pressure groups in the region were
busy arguing the case for an elected assembly, claiming that there was wide-
4ranging support and demanding a referendum to put the issue to the people of
the region (NECC, 2000). It was also notable that the North East’s Regional
Chamber (set up in 1999) very soon renamed itself the ‘North East Assembly’
– a move which clearly anticipated the possibility of elected government in the
region.
In the North East, a range of arguments were developed that underpinned the
case for an elected regional assembly. Firstly, there were (often rather
romanticised) sentiments about regional identity in the North East,
“North East England is our community and a place to be proud of. The
people of the North East have a shared culture which comes from their
history. They have a strong sense of community, born out of the
industries of the past. These industries made sure people had to work
hard, together, to succeed. Around its three major rivers the people of
the region share some of the best landscapes in Britain, including
England’s last wilderness, its finest castles and its greatest cathedral.
People are proud to be from this region and many expatriates want to
return. Of all the English regions, the North East has the strongest
sense of identity. We share a proud history and great potential for the
future.” (‘4 reasons 4 yes,’ quoted in Tickell et al, 2005, p 491)
Secondly, there were also more solid administrative arguments for devolution,
namely: reducing fragmentation, enhancing strategic co-ordination and
improving public policy outcomes (Tomaney, 2002). Moreover, having
experienced deindustrialisation and mass unemployment during the Thatcher
years, it is not surprising that the view also developed in the North East that
there should be some regional ‘counterbalance’ to the powers of the centre
(NECC, 2000).
5Thirdly, there was also a strong political rationale for creating elected regional
assemblies. According to the Campaign for the English Regions, elected
regional government
‘..should provide new opportunities for consultation and participation, bringing
an enhancement of democracy with direct control over services and decisions
at a regional level’ (CFER/LGIU, 2004 p 1)
This emphasis on ‘democratic renewal’ in the regions was partly influenced
by the premise that elected regional assemblies offered new opportunities to
ensure at least some political accountability within the appointed (or quango)
state (Humphrey and Tomaney, 2001). This view is also reinforced by wider
national and international experiences, where decentralised governance is
viewed as allowing access to a greater degree of civic engagement than
supra-national or national levels because they are intrinsically closer to the
citizen (Lindsay, 2000). In this sense, devolved ‘sites of governance’ are seen
as being ideal territory for the development of forms of ‘empowered
deliberative democracy’ (Fung and Olin Wright, 2001). Implicit throughout this
literature is the assumption that the more local and participatory, the more
inclusive and democratic.
The emphasis on inclusivity has been further developed within the literature
on civic (or stakeholder) engagement (McCall and Williamson, 2001; Federal
Trust, 2003). Thus, the Labour Government’s wider devolution agenda (in
London, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales) has seen the introduction of a
range of civic fora - or economic and social partnership bodies - which aimed
6to facilitate the involvement of traditionally marginalised groups into
governance. In Scotland, the aim of the Civic Forum was to
‘..help break the mould of old fashioned politics….increase participation, find
new ways to open up dialogue, raise awareness and stimulate debate on the
many challenges facing Scotland. It will have a vital role in creating a more
open and broadly based political culture’ (Scottish Civic Forum, 2000)
Within the North East, it was argued that the creation of an elected regional
assembly (and a parallel regional civic forum) provided an opportunity to
‘deepen’ democracy through the
‘creation of new and innovative forms of civic or stakeholder involvement - a
new political “space” in which a wide range of citizens could be more fully
involved in the running of their region’ (Humphrey and Shaw, 2004, p 2186)
The Referendum Campaign: Why the North East Voted ‘No’
The North East referendum was held in November 2004. The electorate of
the North East was asked to vote for or against an elected Regional Assembly
and also to vote on proposals for local government reform in the ‘Shire’
Counties (Northumberland and Durham) which have a two tier system of local
government (County and District Councils). If an elected Regional Assembly
was created, local government would be rationalised into a single tier of
‘Unitary Authorities’ in order to avoid having excessive layers of government.
In the run-up to the referendum, ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ campaigns were developed by
regional groups who presented their cases to the public. Both of the officially
recognised campaign groups were funded by Government to do that and
throughout the summer and autumn of 2004, they sought to inform and
7influence the voters. The Yes Campaign emphasised regional identity and
garnered the support of ‘major’ public figures in the North East, such as Sir
John Hall, the creator of the MetroCentre and former chairman of Newcastle
United, and the former Olympic athlete turned business man, Brendan Foster.
The No Campaign said an Assembly would be a talking shop, it would mean
more politicians and was somehow a European plot. The memorable motif of
their campaign (and arguably of the campaign as a whole) was an inflatable
white elephant, which appeared in various places across the region (Knock,
2006, p 690)
In the event, the people of the North East voted ‘No’ to an elected Regional
Assembly. That rejection was decisive (a massive 78% voted ‘No’) and all
parts of the region and all groups (including a majority of Labour voters) were
against the proposals (see Figure 1). The result couldn’t be dismissed on the
grounds of voter apathy: turnout for this postal ballot was a respectable 47%.
It was especially a blow for the Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott, a long
term advocate of regional devolution. And the North East electorate also
effectively scuppered proposals for Regional Assemblies elsewhere – plans
for referenda in other regions were consequently abandoned. So why did the
North East vote ‘No’ and what has happened since the referendum?
8Figure 1: The North East Referendum outcome
Electorate Votes Returned Unadjusted
turnout
Valid
votes
Adjusted
turnout
1,899,742 906,367 47.7% 893,829 47.1%
Maximum turnout: Alnwick 57.4%
Minimum turnout: Middlesbrough 42.1%
‘Yes’
votes
% (as % of
electorate)
‘No’ votes % (as % of
electorate)
197,310 22.1 (10.4) 696,519 77.9 (36.7)
Maximum ‘Yes’: Derwentside 29.8%
Minimum ‘Yes’: Darlington 12.9%
Local government options for new Unitary Authorities
Durham
Option A (Single council) 50.6%
Option B (Three councils) 49.4%
Northumberland
Option A (Single council) 43.8%
Option B (Two councils) 56.2%
Source: (Rallings and Thrasher, 2005 p 3)
A year after that vote, we had the opportunity to explore these issues through
a series of in-depth interviews with 30 people who are involved in running the
North East region and its institutions. This sample of ‘key stakeholders’
covered the main regional governance institutions, together with local
government, other public sector bodies, the private sector, the voluntary and
community sector and other civic organisations (Shaw et al, 2006). An
important part of the research was to ask these people to reflect on the
referendum and talk about its aftermath.
9Many of these interviewees had been supportive of regional devolution, some
more enthusiastic than others. Most had initially assumed that there was a
good chance of a ‘Yes’ vote. But they had been well aware of declining
support for the Regional Assembly proposals as the campaign progressed.
As one said, ‘every person you spoke to was voting no’. By the time of the
referendum, they had become ready for a No vote – but many of our
interviewees were shocked at the scale of the rejection.
Reflecting on the referendum, our sample of stakeholders cited three main
reasons for the outcome:
 Public antipathy and suspicion of politics and politicians
 The proposed Assembly wouldn’t have much power, at least initially–
so it might be just a ‘costly talking shop’.
 The Yes Campaign was weak. It failed to say how an Assembly would
really make a difference, it seemed to be aimed at people who were
already knowledgeable and supportive of the idea, and for most of the
general public it simply wasn’t convincing. The No Campaign was
direct and effective – and it connected with the people’s scepticism.
There were other reasons mentioned too. The timing of the referendum, late
in the last Parliament, suggested the Government was not fully committed to it
(and, indeed, some parts of Government were not). It also gave people an
opportunity to register a protest vote tied into many other concerns – a chance
to give the Government (and Tony Blair) ‘a bloody nose’ (66% of ‘no’ voters
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were unhappy with the prime minister. There were also geographical tensions
within the region: Teesside, for instance, was not keen on what some thought
would be a ‘Geordie Parliament’ dominated by Tyneside (even though it was
said that the Assembly would be neutrally based in Durham). That in itself
raises interesting questions about the strength of a North East regional
identity, as compared with the sub-regional tribalisms displayed so powerfully
through loyalty to football teams.
These points are generally confirmed by the findings of other commentators
(Rallings and Thrasher, 2005; Tickell et al, 2005). Drawing on a MORI survey
of public opinion in the region soon after the referendum, Rallings and
Thrasher noted that there had been scepticism and very limited understanding
of the issues. Tickell et al pointed also to the tone of media coverage, which
had gradually become more negative.
We ourselves were particularly struck by the comment of one of our
interviewees who said:
‘People didn’t really understand the issues – indeed, they weren’t in a
mood to understand’
In the months leading up to the referendum, it became very evident that
people just couldn’t bring themselves to believe what they were being told.
For example, the establishment of a Regional Assembly would have meant
fewer politicians as a result of local government reorganisation cutting out a
tier in the Shire Counties. But people would not believe that. More than that,
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most had little patience to listen to the arguments and decide how best to
vote. That was not because the issues were particularly complex. - it was
more that ‘they weren’t in a mood to understand’.
Perhaps that refusal goes to the heart of the matter. The referendum result is
illustrative of the condition of politics and the political process in the North
East. Many people just have no time for conventional politics. Politicians are
regarded as self-serving; as one councillor said to us:
‘… the public hate the lot of us – they think we’re all crooks and they
can’t be bothered to vote …’
Local government is seen as lacklustre, it doesn’t make much of a difference
and Councils always seem to want to raise Council Tax. Central government
is far away and the region’s MPs don’t seem to deliver for the North East –
which is still the poorest region despite the fact that the Prime Minister and
other senior members of the Government represent constituencies in the
region.
Voting ‘No’ in the referendum is consistent with this disaffected viewpoint –
after all, voting ‘Yes’ would only serve to encourage ‘them’. Democracy is at a
low ebb in the North East:
‘Decades of domination by one party (the Labour Party) has not served
the region well. Debate has been stifled and local politics is sterile,
lacking imagination and vision. Local government, run by a male
gerontocracy, looks and sounds out of date and paternalistic. There is
a widespread dissatisfaction with politics and politicians in the region
and an apathy – or more correctly, a sense that nothing can ever
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change – which leads to low turn-out in local elections’ (Robinson,
2002, p 327).
Generally, people don’t engage with the local political process, don’t know
who their local councillor is and a great many don’t go out to vote.
Furthermore, many public services are in fact not even subject to democratic
control except – perhaps – through a convoluted process of accountability,
ultimately, to Parliament. The NHS, Police, Further and Higher Education,
Learning and Skills Councils, the Regional Development Agency – these, and
other functions, are run by quangos or quango-esque bodies which can’t be
voted out, however badly they perform (Robinson and Shaw, 2003).
This combination, of a weak democracy which generates little interest and
commands little respect, together with a complex quango state, was not fertile
ground for an experiment in regional devolution. The Assembly proposal was
limited and flawed but it did arguably offer some additional power to the
region. However, a sceptical public couldn’t be convinced.
Post- Referendum Governance
Prior to the referendum, the region’s institutions and the government had
been preparing for the advent of an elected Regional Assembly. Then, as
support ebbed away, came the eventual decisive ‘No’ vote. That led to a
good deal of confusion about how best to respond. The problem, as several of
our interviewees put it, was that there was ‘No Plan B’. Since then, the
region’s institutions have had to re-position themselves and things have
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settled down, but there has not been quite the return to ‘business as usual’
that some might well have wanted.
At the regional level, there are three main institutions: One NorthEast (the
Regional Development Agency); Government Office for the North East; and
the (unelected) Regional Assembly. All three have had to adapt to something
that was expected, planned for, and hasn’t happened. The Assembly has had
a particularly tough time since the referendum.
The North East Assembly is one of the Regional Chambers created by the
Government in 1999. About two-thirds of its members are councillors,
nominated by Councils across the region, and the rest represent various
sectors or interests. Soon after it was established, its members decided to
call it the ‘Regional Assembly’, so anticipating the development of an elected
Assembly. It has a small officer team and is funded by Government to fulfil
such roles as scrutinising the work of One NorthEast and producing regional
planning and housing strategies (ODPM, 2005).
Most people did not even know there was such an Assembly when they voted
in the referendum. Now, there is serious confusion which continues to
damage the Assembly; those people who hear about it want to know why
there is an Assembly when they supposedly voted against it. Almost every
week there is a letter in the local press, often from members of the former No
Campaign, where that point is made. It still does have a role, but the
referendum result undermined its legitimacy. One interviewee said that the
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referendum result had left behind ‘embarrassing features of the landscape,
principally the Assembly’. The Assembly evidently had no Plan B, it has
‘struggled to re-assert its role and will have to work hard to gain credibility’.
By contrast, the RDA, One NorthEast has generally benefited from the
referendum result – not least, it has not had to cope with the more complex
accountability that would have been created. With the Assembly seriously
weakened, there is a void in regional governance and One NorthEast has
taken on something of a leadership role. Some of our interviewees welcome
that, while others feel that it cannot be legitimate. One NorthEast is, after all,
a quango whose Board is appointed by, and is accountable to, Government
ministers. It is not answerable to ‘the region’.
The third component institution of what Pearce (2005) has called the regional
‘Troika’ is Government Office North East (GONE), a generally respected
outpost of the civil service. GONE represents Government in the region - it
was described to us as ‘the glorified mouthpiece of ministers’. While it may
articulate the region’s concerns, its business is to serve the Government.
Some interviewees see the region as being like a colony, with GONE as the
colonial administration. One went further than that:
‘The region is like a colony – but it’s not producing the wealth anymore
so it’s not a lot of use – a bit of a waste of space really’.
Undoubtedly, there is a void, left behind as a consequence of the No vote,
and none of these three institutions is able to fill that void. There is no proper
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place for effective regional-level debate, policy-making or, more particularly, a
base for regional leadership. The ground was made ready for a regional tier
of government – and many other institutions, beyond the ‘Troika’, got ready
for that. After the referendum, they all had to pick up the pieces – some, like
the existing Assembly, damaged; some, like One NorthEast, ‘emboldened’, as
one interviewee said; and some just wondering what they are for and what
they should do.
‘Scrabbling around for ideas’
At the time of our interviews in late 2005, there were developing (and often
confusing) debates about city regions, Local Area Agreements, elected
mayors, the ‘Northern Way’ initiative, and so on.
Following the referendum, attempts have been made to find other routes to
reform. As one interviewee put it, ‘people have been scrabbling around for
ideas’. At a pan-regional level, Government set up the ‘Northern Way’
initiative, which brings together the three regions of Northern England to
support and undertake economic development projects (Goodchild and
Hickman, 2006). At the regional level, there has been what some see as
‘creeping regionalisation’ or regionalisation by stealth, creating, for instance,
new regional structures for the Learning and Skills Council and proposed
mergers of the sub-regional Police Forces and also of the Fire Services. The
‘big idea’ at the moment is, however, at the sub-regional level. David
Milliband, Communities and Local Government Minister, has been promoting
16
the concept of ‘city regions’, conurbation-wide governance arrangements
(ODPM, 2006).
In the North East, that would mean Tyne/Wear and the Tees Valley as city
regions, perhaps loosely formed and probably not (as some suggest) with
their own elected mayors. Below that level, there is talk again of reforming
two-tier local government. Also at that local level, an important ongoing reform
is the re-framing of relationships between central and local government
through the new mechanism of ‘Local Area Agreements’ (Sorabji, 2005).
There is also a good deal of rhetoric - and some reality – about ‘empowering’
neighbourhoods. Milliband envisages what he calls ‘double devolution’--to
local authorities, then down to the neighbourhood level.
This Government has a certain enthusiasm for restructuring governance and
public institutions. That enthusiasm has been evident since New Labour came
to power in 1997. Since then, there has been a tremendous amount of
change, creating a bewildering array of new institutions and partnership
arrangements. A Regional Elected Assembly might have helped to give some
coherence to at least some of this by, for example, drawing together the
strategies of different agencies. Since that was ruled out when the region
voted ‘No’, we have seen, instead, yet more structural change at many levels,
with no apparent coherence.
Today, the structure of governance in the North East (and in other areas) is so
complex that few people really understand it and it is very difficult to keep
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track of interminable changes. Our interviewees – people who are involved in
running the region’s institutions – admitted that even they struggle. As one
said:
‘You’d need to be a real anorak to fully understand what all these
organisations are doing and how they interface with each other’.
Indeed, the problem of what Skelcher (2003) has referred to as ‘congested
governance’ has actually worsened under New Labour, with over 40 new
governance structures being launched over the past five years alone (Shaw et
al, 2006 p 22). As one of our interviewees said, ‘it’s difficult to get your head
around it’.
A new agenda for reform?
Whatever the merits or demerits of the proposals for an elected Regional
Assembly, the referendum did highlight attitudes to politics and politicians. It
is actually remarkable that the North East, despite its relatively strong sense
of identity and, more to the point, sense of being ignored by London, so
decisively rejected the promise of greater power to the region. It is
interesting, too, that the turnout was quite high – a good deal higher than for
local council elections. People could be bothered to vote against politicians
and particularly vote against – as many saw it – more politicians, more ‘jobs
for the boys’.
Having found that this formulation of regionalisation led, ultimately, down a
blind alley, the Government has been trying out other ideas. But that tinkering
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with structures, while understandable, doesn’t tackle the political problem
made manifest by the referendum result. Tinkering with structures may help
patch things up and get things done but represents timid, unambitious reform.
It often seems to look like change for the sake of change, without strategic
direction and without tackling the real problems.
We would argue that what is really needed is a serious commitment to what
the Government has in fact said it wants to promote: democratic renewal.
Democratic connections between citizens and the state, between the taxpayer
and public services, need to be rebuilt. Only a reinvigorated democracy could
begin to dispel the cynicism and alienation that characterises the
contemporary political process – and which, we contend, was a main factor
behind the ‘No’ vote in the referendum.
That reinvigoration must start with local government. Over many years, local
government has been marginalised, deprived of powers by central
government, maligned by Government and the public. Councils have been
pushed to the margins by the growth of all kinds of other, unelected, public
bodies and by the development of parallel forms of local governance
(Skelcher, 2003). Given the limited power of local government and its dreary
image, it is hardly surprising that turnouts are low. As Tony Wright argues:
‘Everyone knows that we’re absurdly centralised in this country. I do have
a sense that we need to repair our local democratic system quite urgently
and that on any comparative test, this is a huge deficit in our system, and
that’s going to require some political courage and the will to do that, and
some real culture change. I do think that would be an area where you
would get some real gains if people felt there actually was someone
accountable, locally, for a range of things, and that in turn would have
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good pay-offs for civic engagement’ (Dr Tony Wright MP, Chair, Public
Administration Select Committee, quoted in JRCT, 2006, p 157).
Of course, Governments are very inclined to control local Councils and so
weaken and marginalise them. Governments – perhaps particularly Labour
Governments – don’t rate local councils and don’t trust them. But democratic
renewal must be about giving Councils clout and power – making it worth
voting for them and re-establishing them at the centre of debate and decision-
making at local level. Central government has to act to help revive local
government. In addition, local government has to become more relevant,
more communicative and more representative.
The issue of representativeness is especially important. In the North East,
nearly three-quarters of Councillors are men and the average age of
Councillors is now 58 (Shaw et al, 2006). Councils are clearly not
representative of their electorates, and that is both a cause and consequence
of the image of local government. Few women under the age of 40, for
example, would be tempted to join this male gerontocracy.
The call to reinvigorate local Councils is at the heart of the recent Power to
the People Report, produced jointly by the Joseph Rowntree Charitable and
Reform Trusts. In order to recreate a political system which allows citizens a
‘more direct and focused influence on the political decisions that concern
them’, the report argues for a ‘rebalancing’ of power between the constituent
elements of the political system, in particular a shift of power away from the
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Executive to Parliament and from central to local government (JRCT, 2006,
pp 20-21). In relation to the latter, the report recommends that:
 There should be an unambiguous process of decentralisation of
powers from central to local government
 A Concordat should be drawn up between central and local
government setting out their respective powers
 Local government should have enhanced powers to raise taxes and
administer its own finances
 The Government should commission an independent mapping of
quangos and other public bodies to clarify and renew lines of
accountability between elected and unelected authority
 A responsive electoral system – which offers voters a greater choice
and diversity of parties and candidates – should be introduced for
elections to the House of Commons, House of Lords and local councils
in England and Wales to replace the first-past-the-post system
 The Electoral Commission should take a more active role in promoting
candidacy so that more women, people from black and minority ethnic
communities, people on lower incomes, young people and
independents are encouraged to stand
 The voting and candidacy age should be reduced to sixteen
(JRCT, 2006 pp 22-23)
Put simply, there is no substitute for local democratic control of public
services. And it is possible to imagine that once the public have become
accustomed, again, to local political debate and decision making through their
Councils, they would recognise the merits of extending that – perhaps even to
the point of wanting an elected Regional Assembly. Our hope would be that
many other public services would become democratically controlled. Is it so
fanciful to imagine the public voting for people to sit on the boards of local
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Health Trusts, Police Authorities or the governing bodies of Colleges and
Universities?
Conclusion
This account has sought to examine the North East referendum and its
aftermath, leading on to a broader discussion about reform and democratic
renewal. Some might well wonder whether any of this really matters. As one
of our interviewees said:
‘A lot of people are less concerned about governance than about the
quality of service provision and delivery’.
But most of our interviewees did feel that governance in the North East
doesn’t work particularly well because it is too complex, uncoordinated, is
insufficiently accountable and it lacks vision. Add to that the turmoil of
continual reform creating turbulence, uncertainty and drift across most of the
public sector. It is not a structure well geared to delivering progressive and
effective regional development—it may be that this is one of the reasons why
the North East remains at the bottom of so many social and economic league
tables.
An elected Regional Assembly might have made a difference. Now, instead
of bemoaning what might have been, we should focus on the more
fundamental issues that we need to put right – and which the referendum
highlighted. For us, that has to be about reviving public involvement in the
region’s governance, beginning with local government.
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Back in 2000, long before the referendum, we argued that:
‘Without a revival of local government it will be hard to push for an
extension of democratic local governance – or, for that matter, make a
sufficiently strong case for directly-elected regional government’
(Robinson, Shaw et al, 2000, p. 159).
That is still our view. Considerable effort will be needed to re-establish old
habits of local democracy – but it will be worth it. It can serve as the basis for
wider democratisation. Perhaps, one day, it might even lead to another
referendum about a Regional Assembly, with a different result.
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